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Abstract
We study the problem of oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE). There are two parties, Alice who
has a polynomial P, and Bob who has an input x. The goal is for Bob to compute P(x) in such a way
that Alice learns nothing about x and Bob learns only what can be inferred from P(x). Previously
existing protocols were based on some newly-invented intractability assumptions that have not been
well studied, so one may have doubts about the security of these protocols. In this paper, we propose
OPE protocolswhich are only based on the standard primitive oblivious transfer, and still our protocols
are more efﬁcient in several natural cases. Our protocols can also be easily modiﬁed to handle multi-
variate polynomials and polynomials over ﬂoating-point numbers. As an application, we study the
problem of oblivious neural learning, where one party has a neural network and the other, with some
training set, wants to train the neural network in an oblivious way. We provide a protocol for this
problem, which is based on our protocol for OPE.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cryptography; Security; Oblivious polynomial evaluation; Oblivious transfer; Neural learning
 A preliminary version of this paper appeared inAdvances in Cryptology—ASIACRYPT’01, 2001, pp. 369–384.
∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +886 2 27883799x1820; fax: +886 2 27824814.
E-mail addresses: ycchang@eecs.harvard.edu (Y.-C. Chang), cjlu@iis.sinica.edu.tw (C.-J. Lu).
1 Theworkwas donewhile the authorwas in theDepartment of Computer Science and Information Engineering,
National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan.
0304-3975/$ - see front matter © 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.tcs.2005.03.049
40 Y.-C. Chang, C.-J. Lu / Theoretical Computer Science 341 (2005) 39–54
1. Introduction
Assume that there are two parties, Alice who has a function f and Bob who has an input x.
They want to collaborate in a way for Bob to compute f (x) such that Alice learns nothing
about x and Bob learns only what can be inferred from f (x). A protocol achieving this
task for any function f and any input x is called an oblivious function evaluation protocol.
The remarkable results of Yao [18], Goldreich et al. [9], and Kilian [13] showed that such
protocols do exist, under some standard cryptographic assumptions. Their protocols use
a Boolean circuit to represent the function f and then simulate the computation of this
circuit in some oblivious way. The computational or communicational overhead of their
protocols depends only linearly on the circuit size of the function f, which is the best one
can expect from a complexity-theoretical point of view. However, their protocols are far
from being practical in general, and a lot of work still needs to be done. One line of research
is to study cases when different representations of functions can lead to more efﬁcient
simulation.
Naor and Pinkas [16] considered polynomials over ﬁnite ﬁelds. Note that any function
from m bits to m bits can be represented by a polynomial over a ﬁnite ﬁeld GF(2m), but
its degree could go as high as 2m − 1. So one would like to focus on those functions that
can be represented by low degree polynomials. This turns out to have several interesting
applications [16,8,14,12]. The scheme proposed in [16] is much more efﬁcient than the
conventional way of going through oblivious circuit evaluation, but its security is based on
two assumptions. One assumption is the existence of a secure oblivious transfer protocol
while the other, proposed by themselves, is the intractability of a noisy polynomial interpo-
lation problem. Bleichenbacher and Nguyen [2] later showed that this new assumption may
be much weaker than expected and suggested the use of a possibly stronger intractability
assumption on a polynomial reconstruction problem. Still, no one can say how hard this
problem is as it is not that well-studied. Recently, Lindell and Pinkas [14] mentioned a
not-yet-published OPE protocol, which is also based on some newly proposed assumption.
The assumption is that the decisional Difﬁe–Hellman assumption, denoted as DDH, also
holds over the group Z∗
n2 , where n is the product of two large primes. Contrary to the well
studied DDH over Z∗n [3], more research may need to be done before one can have some
conﬁdence on this new assumption. As there may be doubt on the security of both existing
OPE protocols, a more satisfactory solution is certainly welcome.
As in [16,14], we will focus on the case with semi-honest parties, who may be curious
but still follow the protocol. The malicious case can be handled in some standard way
using commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, which will only be brieﬂy mentioned.
We will propose three OPE protocols of different ﬂavors. Compared to previous ones, the
security of ourﬁrst twoprotocols is onlybasedonawell-accepted cryptographic assumption,
namely, the existence of a secure 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer protocol, denoted as OT21.
For polynomials of degree d over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F, our ﬁrst protocol uses d log |F| invocations
of OT21 while [16] needs (2kd + 1) log m invocations of OT21 for some unspeciﬁed integers
k andm d depending on their proposed assumption. 2 Note that for the problem in their
2 Actually they use 2kd + 1 invocations of 1-out-of-m oblivious transfer, denoted as OTm1 . It is known that one
OTm1 can be simulated by log m calls to OT
2
1, together with several evaluations of a pseudo-random function [16].
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assumption to be intractable, at least m must be very large just to prevent a brute-force
algorithm that tries every possibility. So, even with their additional security concern, their
protocol is better than ours only when |F| > m2k , i.e. when |F| is very large. Moreover,
other than carrying out OT’s, our protocol involves only extremely simple computation. Our
second protocol is less efﬁcient than our ﬁrst one, but we include it here as the technique for
achieving security seems interesting and may have other applications. Our third protocol
involves a third partywhodoes not colludewith others butmaybe curious, andour protocol is
perfectly secure,without any cryptographic assumption.Unlike that of [16], all our protocols
can immediately handle multi-variate polynomials.
Many important applications in real life involve numerical computation over ﬂoating-
point numbers, instead of over integers or arbitrary ﬁnite ﬁelds. To do OPE over ﬂoating-
point numbers, the approach of Lindell and Pinkas [14] is to embed ﬂoating-point numbers
into a ﬁnite ﬁeld, apply some OPE protocol over the ﬁnite ﬁeld, and then convert the result
back to a ﬂoating-point number. On the other hand, as our protocols evaluate polynomials
in a more natural way, they can be easily modiﬁed to operate directly on ﬂoating-point
numbers.
In addition to computing functions obliviously, some computational tasks may also in-
volve security issues and people may want to perform them in some oblivious way. We use
machine learning as an example, and demonstrate the applicability of our OPE protocol
over ﬂoating-point numbers. Lindell and Pinkas [14] considered the scenario where two
parties, each holding a private database, want to jointly construct a decision tree that clas-
siﬁes entries in both databases, using a so-called ID3 algorithm. Such a kind of learning is
not robust to changes in the sense that small changes to a database may require the whole
process to be run again. We use neural network as our learning model and consider the
following scenario. Alice has a neural network which is trained to some degree and she
uses it to serve the classiﬁcation requests from other parties. Alice wants to keep her neural
network secret, while others want to keep their requests secret. This is the task of oblivious
neural computing. At some point, another party Bob with a set of training examples wants
to help Alice’s neural network get better, maybe for his own good later. Alice wants to have
a secure learning process so that Bob learns nothing from her, while Bob also wants to keep
his training set secret. Later, other parties having their own training set can help Alice too,
and Alice’s neural network can adapt in an incremental way. This is the task of oblivious
neural learning. We will apply our OPE protocol over ﬂoating-point numbers, and derive
protocols for oblivious neural computing and oblivious neural learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give deﬁnitions and tools
that will be used later. Three OPE protocols are proposed in Section 3. In Section 4, we
show oblivious protocols for neural computing and learning.
2. Preliminaries
For a positive integer n, let [n] denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For an n-dimensional vector v, let
vi , for i ∈ [n], denote the component in the ith dimension, and we write v = (v1, . . . , vn) =
(vi)i∈[n]. Fix a security parameter , so that numbers about 2− are considered negligible
and circuits of sizes about 2 are considered infeasible. For a distribution D over a set S, let
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D(i), for i ∈ S, denote the probability of i according to D, and deﬁneD(A), for A ⊆ S, to
be
∑
i∈A D(i).
Deﬁnition 1. Let D and D′ be two distributions over a set S. Their distance is deﬁned as
d(D,D′) = maxA⊆S dA(D,D′), with dA(D,D′) = |D(A)−D′(A)|.
Note that d(D,D′) = 12
∑
i∈S |D(i) − D′(i)|, which is a useful way for calculating
d(D,D′).
Deﬁnition 2. Let D and D′ be two distributions. They are statistically indistinguishable,
denoted asD s≡ D′, if d(D,D′) is negligible. They are computationally indistinguishable,
denoted as D c≡ D′, if dA(D,D′) is negligible for any subset A decided by a circuit of
feasible size. 3
We will assume that parties in our protocols have only circuits of feasible sizes for
computation unless mentioned otherwise. So we will focus on computational security, and
the default distinguishability will be the computational one.
An important cryptographic primitive is the 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer, denoted as
OT21. There are several variants which are all equivalent, and the one most suited for us is
the following string version of OT21. Let F be a set.
Deﬁnition 3. An OT21 protocol has two parties, Sender who has input (x0, x1) ∈ F2 and
Chooser who has a choice c ∈ {0, 1}. The protocol is correct if the Chooser learns xc for
any (x0, x1) and c. The protocol is secure if both conditions below are satisﬁed for any
(x0, x1) and c:
• Chooser cannot distinguish the distribution of Sender’s messages from that induced by
Sender having a different value of x1−c.
• Sender cannot distinguish the distributions of Chooser’s messages induced by c and
1− c.
Similarly one can deﬁne OTk1 for any k3, with Sender having k elements and Chooser
wanting to learn one. We will use OTk1, for k2, to denote an assumed correct and secure
OTk1 protocol. It is known that the existence of OT
2
1 implies the existence of OT
k
1 for any
k3 [5,16].
Deﬁnition 4. A protocol for oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) has two parties, Alice
who has a polynomial P over some ﬁnite ﬁeld F and Bob who has an input x∗ ∈ F. An
OPE protocol is correct if Bob learns P(x∗) for any x∗ and P. It is secure if both conditions
below are satisﬁed for any x∗ and P:
• Alice cannot distinguish the distribution of Bob’s messages from that induced by Bob
having a different x′∗.
3 Note that for A decided by a circuit C, dA(D,D′) = |Prx∈D[C(x) = 1] − Prx∈D′ [C(x) = 1]|.
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• Bob cannot distinguish the distribution of Alice’s messages from that induced by Alice
having a different P ′ with P ′(x∗) = P(x∗).
We say that a party in a protocol is semi-honest if the party follows the protocol but
may try to learn more information than he or she should. We only focus on semi-honest
parties in this paper. The case of malicious parties can be handled in a standard way, using
commitments and zero-knowledge proofs, which will only be brieﬂy sketched for our ﬁrst
protocol.
SupposeD andD′ are two distributions depending on distributionsE andE′, respectively.
For any possible outcome t of E and E′, let (D|E = t) and (D′|E′ = t) denote the
distributions of D and D′ conditioned on E = t and E′ = t , respectively. Here is a useful
lemma for showing D c≡ D′, which will be used several times in our security proofs later.
Lemma 1. D c≡ D′ provided E s≡ E′ and (D|E = t) c≡ (D′|E′ = t) for any t.
Proof. Let C be a circuit which outputs 1 with probabilities p and p′ with respect to D
and D′. Let pt and p′t denote the corresponding probabilities with respect to (D|E = t)
and (D′|E′ = t). Let qt = E(t) and q ′t = E′(t). Then
|p − p′| =
∣∣∣∣∑
t
qtpt −∑
t
q ′tp′t
∣∣∣∣
∑
t
|qtpt − qtp′t | +
∑
t
|qtp′t − q ′tp′t |
∑
t
qt |pt − p′t | +
∑
t
|qt − q ′t |
So if
∑
t |qt−q ′t | is negligible and each |pt−p′t | is negligible, then |p−p′| is negligible. 
Some cases later have identical E and E′, and we only need to check each |pt − p′t |.
A family H of functions from S1 to S2 is said to satisfy a pair-wise
independent property if for any distinct , ′ ∈ S1,
Pr
h∈H [h() = h(
′)] = 1|S2| .
Let (H,H(S1)) denote the distribution of (h, h(v))with random h ∈ H and random v ∈ S1,
and let (H, S2) denote the uniform distribution over H × S2. We will use the following
lemma, which is a special case of the so-called leftover Hash lemma [10,11].
Lemma 2. Let H be any family of functions from S1 to S2 satisfying the pair-wise indepen-
dent property. Then d((H,H(S1)), (H, S2)) 12
√|S2|/|S1|.
A proof of this lemma is given in the appendix for completeness.
3. Oblivious polynomial evaluation protocols
Wewill present three OPE protocols of different ﬂavors in this section. Assume that both
parties have agreed that polynomials are over a ﬁnite ﬁeld F and have degrees at most d. The
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set of such polynomials can be identiﬁed with the set T = Fd+1 in a natural way. Suppose
now Alice has a polynomial P(x) =∑di=0 aixi ∈ T and Bob has x∗ ∈ F.
3.1. The ﬁrst protocol for OPE
To make the picture clear, we only discuss the case F = GF(p) for some prime p. The
generalization to GF(pk) with k > 1 is straightforward. Let m = ⌈log2 |F|⌉. Each coefﬁ-
cient ai in the polynomial can be represented as ai =∑j∈[m] aij2j−1 with aij ∈ {0, 1}. For
i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [m], let vij = 2j−1xi∗. Note that for each i ∈ [d],
∑
j∈[m] aij vij = aixi∗.
The idea is to have Bob prepare (vij )j∈[m] and haveAlice get those vij with aij = 1, in some
secret way. This is achieved by having Bob prepare the pair (rij , vij + rij ) for a random
noise rij , and having Alice get what she wants via OT21. Note that what Alice obtains is
aij vij + rij . Here is our ﬁrst protocol, basing only on the existence of secure OT21.
Protocol 1
1. Bob prepares dm pairs (rij , vij + rij )i∈[d],j∈[m], with each rij chosen randomly
from F.
2. For each pair (rij , vij + rij ), Alice runs an independent OT21 with Bob to get rij if
aij = 0 and vij + rij otherwise.
3. Alice sends to Bob the sum of a0 and those dm values she got. Bob subtracts∑
i,j rij from it to obtain P(x∗).
Lemma 3. Protocol 1 is correct when parties are semi-honest.
Proof. The sum Bob obtains from Alice in Step 3 is a0+∑i∑j (aij vij + rij ) = P(x∗)+∑
i,j rij . 
Lemma 4. Protocol 1 is secure when parties are semi-honest.
Proof. First, we prove Alice’s security. Suppose P and P ′ are two distinct polynomials
with P(x∗) = P ′(x∗) = y∗. According to Lemma 1, it sufﬁces to show that for any ﬁxed
(rij )i∈[d],j∈[m], Alice’s respective message distributions D and D′ induced by P and P ′
are indistinguishable. Note that the last message from Alice is y∗ +∑i,j rij for both P
and P ′ and can be ignored. So we focus on Alice’s dm messages from the dm independent
executions of OT’s. For 0kdm, letDk denote the distribution with the ﬁrst kmessages
fromD and the remaining messages fromD′. Assume that there exists a distinguisher C for
D andD′. A standard argument shows that C can also distinguishDk0−1 andDk0 for some
k0. Note that Alice must select different elements from that pair in the k0th OT, as otherwise
the two distributions are identical. Then one can break Chooser’s security in OT21 when
Sender has this input, because with Chooser’s messages for different choices replacing the
k0th message of Dk0−1, we get exactly Dk0−1 and Dk0 , which can be distinguished by C.
As OT21 is assumed to be secure, D and D′ are indistinguishable, and Alice is secure.
Next, we prove Bob’s security. Note that Bob sends dm messages to Alice for the dm
independent executions of OT’s. Let x∗ = x′∗, let E and E′ be Bob’s respective message
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distributions, and let Ek denote the distribution with the ﬁrst k messages from E and the
remaining messages from E′. Suppose a distinguisher for E and E′ exists. Then it can also
distinguish Ek0−1 and Ek0 for some k0. The pairs in that k0th OT have the forms (r, v + r)
and (r ′, v′ + r ′), for some ﬁxed v and v′ and for random r and r ′. Alice’s polynomial is
ﬁxed, so which element to choose in that k0th OT is also ﬁxed. Suppose Alice chooses
the ﬁrst one in that pair. Then according to Lemma 1, there is a ﬁxed r0 such that Ek0−1
conditioned on Bob having (r0, v+ r0) andEk0 conditioned on Bob having (r0, v′ + r0) are
distinguishable. Similarly as before, one can distinguish Sender’s messages when Sender
has (r0, v + r0) and (r0, v′ + r0), respectively and Chooser selects the ﬁrst element, which
violates Sender’s security in OT21. The case when Alice chooses the second one in that
pair can be argued similarly, by noticing that the distribution (r, v+ r) and the distribution
(−v + r, r) are identical. As OT21 is assumed to be secure, so is Bob. 
Theorem 5. Protocol 1 is correct and secure when parties are semi-honest.
Note that only dm invocations ofOT21 are required and they can be done concurrently.Also
observe that if OT21 can achieve perfect security for Chooser (e.g. [1]) in the information-
theoretical sense, then so is Protocol 1 for Alice.
A slight modiﬁcation to Protocol 1 can handle the case of malicious parties. The only
complication is to enforce a malicious Bob to prepare dm pairs that are consistent in the
sense that there is some x∗ such that vij = 2j−1xi∗ for every i and j, which can be achieved
as follows. Bob sends his commitments of dm pairs to Alice, Alice uses OT21 to have her dm
choices decommitted, and Bob uses a zero-knowledge proof to convince Alice that those
dm pairs are consistent. All these can be done using, for example, the methods in [13].
3.2. The second protocol for OPE
The idea of our second protocol is to have Alice hide the random shares of her polynomial
P among other random polynomials, have Bob evaluate all of them on his input x∗, and then
have Alice select those values corresponding to the shares, which sum to P(x∗). Recall that
T = Fd+1. Let n = log |T| + 2. For P ∈ T and R = (R1, . . . , Rn) ∈ Tn, deﬁne the
function hR,P : {0, 1}n → T as
hR,P () = P − ∑
i∈[n]
iRi .
It is easy to check that for any P ∈ T, the class HP = {hR,P : R ∈ Tn} satisﬁes the
pair-wise independent property. Here is our second OPE protocol, which is also based on
OT21 only.
Protocol 2
1. Alice generates random R ∈ Tn and  ∈ {0, 1}n and sends (R1, . . . , Rn, hR,P ())
to Bob. Let Rn+1 = hR,P () and n+1 = 1.
2. Bob generates random r ∈ Fn+1 and prepares n+ 1 pairs (ri, Ri(x∗)+ ri)i∈[n+1].
3. For pair i, Alice runs an OT21 with Bob to get ri if i = 0 andRi(x∗)+ ri otherwise.
4. Alice sends the sum of the n + 1 values to Bob. Bob subtracts∑n+1i=1 ri from it to
get P(x∗).
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Theorem 6. Protocol 2 is correct and secure when parties are semi-honest.
Proof. The correctness is obvious because the sum that Bob obtains from Alice in Step 4
is
∑n+1
i=1 iRi(x∗)+
∑n+1
i=1 ri = P(x∗)+
∑n+1
i=1 ri . Bob’s security proof is almost identical
to that of Protocol 1, so we only prove Alice’s security here.
Fix any two polynomials P,P ′ ∈ T, letD andD′ denote Alice’s respective message dis-
tributions, and let E andE′ be Alice’s respective message distributions in Step 1. According
to Lemma 1, it sufﬁces to show E s≡ E′ and (D|E = t) c≡ (D′|E′ = t) for each t ∈ T.
Using an argument similar to that in Protocol 1, one can show (D|E = t) c≡ (D′|E′ = t) for
each t ∈ T as otherwise one can break Chooser’s security in OT21. Note that the familyHP
satisﬁes the pair-wise independent property and E is the distribution (HP ,HP ({0, 1}n)).
With n = log |T| + 2 = (d + 1)m+ 2, leftover Hash lemma (Lemma 2) guarantees that
the distance between E and the uniform distribution is at most
√|T|2−n = 2−, which is
negligible. Similarly E′ also has a negligible distance to the uniform one. So d(E,E′) is
negligible and E s≡ E′. According to Lemma 1, Alice is secure. 
Note that there are (n + 1) log |T| = O(dm(dm + )) bits sent in Step 1, O(dm + )
executions of OT21 in Step 3, and m bits sent in Step 4.
3.3. A protocol for 3-party OPE
Here, we show how to remove the use of OT21 with the help of a third party Clark. As
a result, our protocol does not rely on any cryptographic assumption and is information-
theoretically secure when no collusion exists. Again, we assume that Alice has a polyno-
mial P ∈ T, Bob has x∗ ∈ F and only Bob learns P(x∗). Now the security must also
hold against Clark so that the messages he receives altogether look completely random to
him; i.e.,
• Clark cannot distinguish the uniform distribution from the joint distribution of messages
he receives from Alice and Bob.
Note that our model is slightly different from that of Feige et al. [7], who have Clark as the
party to receive the result. Here is the protocol.
Protocol 3
1. Bob sends random (ri)i∈[k] ∈ Fk to Alice. He also sends (x′i = xi∗ + ri)i∈[k] to
Clark.
2. Alice sends random (si)0 ik ∈ Fk+1 to Bob. She also sends a′0 = a0 + s0 −∑
i∈[k] airi and (a′i = ai + si)i∈[k] to Clark.
3. Clark sends y = a′0 +
∑
i∈[k] a′ix′i to Bob, and Bob gets P(x∗) = y − (s0 +∑
i∈[k] x′i si).
Theorem 7. Protocol 3 is correct and perfectly secure provided no collusion exists.
Proof. The correctness is easy to verify.WhatAlice orClark receives is completely random.
Bob receives random (si)0 ik in Step 2, and receives P(x∗) + s0 +∑i∈[k] (xi∗ + ri)si
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in Step 3, so he sees the same distribution for any polynomial P ′ with P ′(x∗) = P(x∗). So
each party is perfectly secure as long as no collusion exists. 
3.4. Generalizations
It is not hard to see that all the protocols in this section can be easily extended to deal with
multi-variate polynomials. In particular, we can solve an interesting special case: Alice has
a = (ai)i∈[n] ∈ Fn while Bob has x = (xi)i∈[n] ∈ Fn and wants to learn the inner product
ax =∑i∈[n] aixi .
We have only considered the setting where Alice and Bob have their own inputs and
Bob gets the ﬁnal result. Later we will see a variation with each input and output shared by
the two parties. We call this computing with random shares. Let us use the inner product
function as an example. Suppose that Alice has u, v ∈ Fn and Bob has u′, v′ ∈ Fn. They
want to compute the inner product of u+u′ and v+v′, and produce random shares, one for
each party, that sum to the inner product. This generalization can be reduced to the original
problem in the following way. Note that (u+ u′)(v + v′) is equal to
(uv)+ (uv′ + vu′)+ (u′v′).
Now Alice generates a random r ∈ F and prepares the 2(n+ 1)-dimensional vector
a = (−r + uv, u1, . . . , un, v1, . . . , vn, 1),
while Bob prepares the 2(n+ 1)-dimensional vector
x = (1, v′1, . . . , v′n, u′1, . . . , u′n, u′v′).
Bob can obtain ax = −r + (u+ u′)(v + v′) using a protocol for the original problem, and
each party now holds a random share of the inner product (u + u′)(v + v′). The variation
for multi-variate polynomials can be handled similarly.
4. Oblivious neural learning
In this section, we introduce the problem of oblivious neural learning, and then give a
protocol for this problem. As we deal with ﬂoating-point numbers in this setting, we ﬁrst
show how to modify our protocols in the previous section to obtain protocols for ﬂoating-
point numbers.
4.1. OPE protocols for ﬂoating-point numbers
We ﬁrst give the deﬁnition of a ﬂoating-point number system.
Deﬁnition 5. A ﬂoating-point number is a rational number b = ± ∑2mj=1 bj2m−j for
some m, with bj ∈ {0, 1}. Let mˆ denote the ﬂoating-point number system containing all
such numbers together with standard arithmetic operations.
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Such a ﬂoating-point number can be represented by 2m+ 1 bits: m bits for the fractional
part, m bits for the integral part, and 1 bit for the sign. Unlike ﬁnite ﬁelds, operations in a
ﬂoating-point number system are not closed and errors may occur because of the limitation
of ﬁnite precision. An underﬂow occurs when the produced number needs more bits for
the fractional part, and a rounding takes place to convert it into the nearest number in the
ﬂoating-point number system. An overﬂow occurs when the produced number needs more
bits for the integral part, and the result is left undeﬁned.
When we want to hide an element v of a ﬁnite ﬁeld F in our previous protocols, we
generate a pair (r, r + v) with a random r ∈ F, so that any element of the pair itself looks
completely random. There is a slight complication for ﬂoating-point numbers, but it can be
easily ﬁxed.
Lemma 8. Suppose v, v′ ∈ %ˆ for some % and suppose k% +  + 1. The distributions of
v + r and v′ + r ′ with random r, r ′ ∈ kˆ have a negligible distance.
Proof. The distance is at most
|v − v′|
2(2k − 2−k)+ 1
2%+1
2k
2−. 
Next, we describe how to do OPE over ﬂoating-point numbers. Assume Alice holds
P(x) = ∑di=0 aixi , where ai ∈ mˆ, and Bob holds x∗ ∈ mˆ. For each i, let |ai | =∑2m
j=1 aij2m−j , with aij ∈ {0, 1}. All our previous protocols can be easily modiﬁed
for ﬂoating-point numbers, and here we only demonstrate one, which comes from Pro-
tocol 1. We will use OT31, which can be implemented by 2 executions of OT
2
1 [16]. Let
k = (d + 1)m+ + 1 and n = k + log(2dm). Parties agree on the ﬂoating-point number
system kˆ for random numbers, and the ﬂoating-point number system nˆ for all arithmetics
so that no underﬂow or overﬂow will ever occur. Let vij = 2m−j xi∗.
Protocol 4
1. Bob prepares 2dm 3-tuples (rij , vij + rij ,−vij + rij )i∈[d],j∈[2m], with each rij
chosen randomly from kˆ.
2. For each 3-tuple (rij , vij + rij ,−vij + rij ), Alice runs an OT31 with Bob to get rij
if aij = 0, vij + rij if aij = 1 ∧ ai > 0, and −vij + rij otherwise.
3. Alice sends to Bob the sum of a0 and those 2dm values she got. Bob subtracts∑
i,j rij from it to obtain P(x∗).
Note that all the arithmetic are carried out in the system nˆ, which is large enough to
guarantee that no error ever occurs. Then it’s not hard to verify the correctness of this
protocol, while its security is guaranteed by the following.
Lemma 9. Protocol 4 is secure when parties are semi-honest.
Proof. Alice’s security proof is almost identical to that of Protocol 1, so we only discuss
Bob’s security here. Let x∗, x′∗ ∈ mˆ, let E andE′ be Bob’s respective message distributions,
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and let Ek denote the distribution with the ﬁrst k messages from E and the remaining
messages from E′. Suppose Ek0−1 and Ek0 can be distinguished, for some k0, and the
3-tuples in that k0th OT have the forms (r, v + r,−v + r) and (r ′, v′ + r ′,−v′ + r ′), for
random r and r ′ and for some ﬁxed v and v′. Let % = (d + 1)m and note that v, v′ ∈ %ˆ
because 2m−j xi ∈ %ˆ for any x ∈ mˆ, i ∈ [d] and j ∈ [2m]. Then according to Lemma 8, no
matter which element Alice chooses, the two distributions of that element have a negligible
distance. Using Lemma 1 and adapting Bob’s security proof for Protocol 1, one can show
that E and E′ are indistinguishable. 
Note that the generalizations discussed inSection 3.4 also hold for ﬂoating-point numbers,
and we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10. Oblivious protocols exist for the problem of multi-variate polynomial eval-
uation (with random shares) over ﬂoating-point numbers.
4.2. Neural computing and learning
There are several variants of the neural network model. We only demonstrate our result
via 2-layer feedforward neural networks with back-propagation learning. Other variants can
be handled similarly.
A 2-layer feedforward neural network N has an internal layer of J nodes, with the jth
node having a weight vector uj = (uj1, . . . , ujI ), and an output layer of K nodes, with
the kth node having a weight vector wk = (wk1, . . . , wkJ ). Each node is associated with
an activation function f (z) = a tanh(bz) (the hyperbolic tangent function). The network
takes an input vector x = (x1, . . . , xI ) and produces an output vector o = (o1, . . . , oK) in
the following way.
Neural Computing
1. Compute yj = f (ujx) for j ∈ [J ]. Let y = (y1, . . . , yJ ).
2. Compute ok = f (wky) for k ∈ [K].
The output vector o may not be correct, and a learning algorithm adjusts the weights
according to how the vector o differs from the correct output vector d. The pair (x, d)
constitutes a training example. Given a set S of training examples, the back-propagation
learning (BP-Learning) algorithm adjusts the weights in the following way, with  being
some learning constant.
BP-Learning
For each training example in the training set S, perform the following.
1. Compute yj and ok for j ∈ [J ] and k ∈ [K].
2. Compute ok = ba (dk − ok)(a2 − o2k) for k ∈ [K].
3. Compute yj = ba (a2 − y2j )
∑K
k=1 okwkj for j ∈ [J ].
4. Update wkj = wkj + okyj for k ∈ [K] and j ∈ [J ].
5. Update uji = uji + yj xi for i ∈ [I ] and j ∈ [J ].
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Once the process above is done, we get a new neural network, and we use NS to denote
the resulting neural network trained by the training set S. Note that a neural network is
completely speciﬁed by the IJ + JK weights it has. 4
4.3. Oblivious neural computing and learning
Now we want to carry out neural computing and neural learning in an oblivious way
between two parties, Alice and Bob. Oblivious neural computing can be deﬁned in a way
similar to oblivious polynomial evaluation, except with Alice’s polynomial replaced by a
neural network.
Deﬁnition 6. A protocol for oblivious neural computing (ONC) has two parties, Alice who
has a private 2-layered feedforward neural networkN (speciﬁed by IJ+JK private weights)
and Bob who has a private input vector x. An ONC protocol is correct if Bob can obtain
the value N (x) for any x and N . It is secure if both conditions below are satisﬁed for any
x and N :
• Alice cannot distinguish the distribution of Bob’s messages from that induced by Bob
having a different x′.
• Bob cannot distinguish the distribution of Alice’s messages from that induced by Alice
having a different N ′ with N ′(x) = N (x).
For oblivious neural learning, Bob has a set of training examples and wants to train
Alice’s neural network so that Bob knows nothing about Alice’s neural network while we
want Alice to know as little as possible about Bob’s training set. We need to be careful
about Bob’s security, as Alice’s neural network has IJ + JK weights and that many weight
changes may reveal a lot to Alice, so we do not let Alice know the weight changes induced
by each training example. There are two scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario, we only allow Alice
to get the overall weight changes after the training of all examples. Now a learning protocol
is secure for Bob if Alice cannot distinguish two training sets that give the same overall
weight changes. Note that in practice, neural learning typically involves large training sets,
so only a small amount of information about the training set may be revealed to Alice.
Formally, we have the following.
Deﬁnition 7. A protocol for oblivious neural learning (ONL) has two parties, Alice who
has a private 2-layered feedforward neural network N and Bob who has a private set
S of training examples in the form of (x, d). An ONL protocol is correct if Alice learns
NS for any S and N . It is secure if both conditions below are satisﬁed for any S
and N :
• Alice cannot distinguish the distribution of Bob’s messages from that induced by Bob
having a different S ′ with NS ′ = NS .
4 For simplicity we assume the parameters of the activation function (i.e. a and b) are publicly ﬁxed, yet we
can in fact make them privately accessible to Alice only. This has no impact on the correctness or security of our
protocols.
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• Bob cannot distinguish the distribution of Alice’s messages from that induced by Alice
having a different N ′.
The second scenario is for Bob to keep random shares of those ﬁnal weights, as long as
he is willing to help Alice serve requests from other parties for oblivious neural computing.
Later when another party wants to continue the training of Alice’s neural network, Bob only
needs to help with his shares for the ﬁrst training example, and his duty is off after that.
Contrary to the previous scenario, Alice cannot learn anything about Bob’s training set in
this way. This leads to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 8. Aprotocol for strong oblivious neural learning (SONL) has two parties, Alice
who has a private 2-layered feedforward neural network N and Bob who has a private set
S of training examples in the form of (x, d). An SONL protocol is correct if Alice and Bob
obtain random shares of (the weights of)NS for any S andN . It is secure if both conditions
below are satisﬁed for any S and N :
• Alice cannot distinguish the distribution of Bob’s messages from that induced by Bob
having a different S ′.
• Bob cannot distinguish the distribution of Alice’s messages from that induced by Alice
having a different N ′.
4.4. Oblivious activation function evaluation
Here we discuss options for evaluating the activation function f (z) = a tanh(bz) =
a(1− [2/(1+ e2bz)]) in an oblivious way. We will rely on a protocol for oblivious circuit
evaluation [18,9,17], denoted as OCE, which is efﬁcient for small circuits. Assume that
Alice has x while Bob has y, and they want to generate random shares of f (x + y) for
Alice and Bob. One way is to use an OCE directly, if one can accept that the circuit for f
is reasonably small. For cases allowing a large b, f (z) is close to the threshold function,
which has a very simple circuit, and again we can use OCE directly. Otherwise, we will
approximate f in a piece-wise way by low degree polynomials and then apply our OPE
protocol for it, which is described in the following. As f is smooth, there are intervals I0 =
(−∞, %0], I1 = (%0, %1], . . . , In = (%n−1,∞), and degree-d polynomials P0, P1, . . . , Pn
such that
f (z) ≈ Pi(z) for z ∈ Ii,
for some small n and d, which seem good enough for practical purposes. 5 Let I be the
function such that I (z) = i for z ∈ Ii , which has a rather simple circuit and thus an efﬁcient
OCE protocol. Let Pi,x(y) = Pi(x + y). Here is the oblivious protocol for evaluating the
activation function.
5 For example, the error can be bounded by 2 × 10−6 with n = 9, d = 9, %0 = −7, %8 = 7, P0 = −1, and
P9 = 1.
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Protocol 5
1. Alice generate random r1. Bob runs OCE with Alice to get r2 = I (x + y)− r1.
2. Alice generate random s1 and prepares the polynomial
Qx(t, y) = −s1 +
n∑
i=0
∏
j =i (t + r1 − j)∏
j =i (i − j)
Pi,x(y).
3. Bob runs OPE with Alice for s2 = Qx(r2, y).
Note that Alice has s1 and Bob has s2 with s1 + s2 = Pi(x + y) for x + y ∈ Ii , so the
protocol is correct. The security proof is somewhat standard and similar arguments have
appeared in many places, such as Lemma 4 and [15].
4.5. Oblivious neural algorithms
First we need to determine the possible range of ﬂoating-point numbers that can ever
occur during computation. Then we can determine an appropriate ﬂoating-point number
system kˆ for random numbers and a system nˆ for error-free arithmetics. Here is the proto-
col for oblivious neural computing which uses the OPE protocol with random shares and
Protocol 5.
Protocol 6
1. For j ∈ [J ], Alice and Bob compute random shares sj1, sj2 of the inner product
ujx, and then compute random shares yj1, yj2 of yj = f (sj1 + sj2). Let y =
(y1, . . . , yJ ).
2. For k ∈ [K], Alice and Bob compute random shares tk1, tk2 of wky, and then
compute random shares ok1, ok2 of ok = f (tk1 + tk2).
At the end, Alice just needs to send her shares ok1’s to Bob for him to obtain the output
vector o. (This is not needed in the case of oblivious neural learning.)
Theorem 11. Oblivious neural computing can be achieved by Protocol 6.
Proof. The correctness is easy to verify. The security relies on the security of the two con-
stituent sub-protocols, the protocol for oblivious polynomial evaluation with random shares
and Protocol 5. This is because in addition to the messages exchanged during invocations
of the two sub-protocols, what Alice or Bob sees are those random shares produced by the
sub-protocols which are random and independent numbers. Using a standard hybrid argu-
ment, one can easily show that if one had an adversary to break Protocol 6, then one could
construct from it an adversary that can break one of the sub-protocols. This is impossible
because both sub-protocols have been shown to be secure before. We omit the formal proof
here because it is very similar to that of Lemma 4. 
Next, let us consider oblivious neural learning. Recall that the neural learning is done by
performing neural computing ﬁrst and then adjusting weights according to how the output
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differs from the correct one, for each training example in the training set. We want to carry
out this process in an oblivious way. Initially, the neural network is completely owned
by Alice. But recall from Section 4.3 that for security purpose, we let the updated neural
network be randomly shared by Alice and Bob after each training example. So we need to
modify Protocol 6 to work in this setting, and this indeed can be done easily. To update
each weight on the neural network, we use our protocol for OPE with random shares, and
each new weight is randomly shared by Alice and Bob. Formally, here is our protocol for
oblivious neural learning.
Protocol 7
For each training example in the training set, perform the following.
1. Alice and Bob compute random shares of each yj and each ok using modiﬁed
Protocol 6.
2. Alice and Bob compute random shares of each ok = ba (dk − ok)(a2 − o2k).
3. Alice and Bob compute random shares of each yj = ba (a2 − y2j )
∑K
k=1 okwkj .
4. Alice and Bob compute random shares of each wkj = wkj + okyj .
5. Alice and Bob compute random shares of each uji = uji + yj xi .
Note that at the end of Protocol 7, after all the training example, the ﬁnal neural network
is shared by Alice and Bob. If Alice wants to have the ﬁnal neural network (as opposed to
just a random share), we just let Bob send his share to her.
Theorem 12. Oblivious neural learning can be achieved by Protocol 7.
Proof. The correctness of the protocol is easy to verify. The security proof is similar to
that of Theorem 11. This is because Protocol 7 uses the same two sub-protocols, and what
Alice or Bob sees again consists merely of the messages exchanged and the random shares
produced by the sub-protocols. So by a standard hybrid argument, which is again simi-
lar to that of Lemma 4 and omitted here, one can prove that any adversary for breaking
Protocol 7 can be used to construct an adversary for breaking one of the sub-protocols.
Thus, Protocol 7 satisﬁes the condition of Deﬁnition 8. If Bob sends his share of the ﬁ-
nal neural network to Alice, it is not hard to verify that the condition of Deﬁnition 7 is
satisﬁed. 
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 2
Let % = |H ||S2|. From Cauchy–Schwartz,∑h,v ∣∣Prg,u[(g, g(u)) = (h, v)] − 1/%∣∣ is at
most
√
%
√√√√∑
h,v
(
Pr
g,u
[(g, g(u)) = (h, v)] − 1/%
)2
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=
√
%
∑
h,v
Pr
g,u
[(g, g(u)) = (h, v)]2 − 2+ 1
=
√
% Pr
h,h′,u,u′
[(h, h(u)) = (h′, h′(u′))] − 1
=
√
% Pr
h,h′
[h = h′] Pr
h,u,u′
[h(u) = h(u′)] − 1

√
%|H |−1( Pr
u,u′
[u = u′] + Pr
h,u,u′
[h(u) = h(u′)|u = u′])− 1
= √|S2| (1/|S1| + 1/|S2|)− 1
= √|S2|/|S1|.
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